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NOTES
CONSCIOUS PARALLELISM IN THE USE OF
DELIVERED PRICING SYSTEMS: A MODIFIED
PER SE STANDARD OF REVIEW
UNDER THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT
The legality of conscious parallelism 1 long has been a debated
issue in antitrust law.2  Commentators similarly have debated the
treatment of delivered pricing systems 3 under the antitrust laws, al-
though the subject has not received much recent attention. 4  Courts
have consistently held agreements to use identical delivered pricing
systems violative of the antitrust laws.5 Although most commentators
maintain that the antitrust laws do not proscribe conscious parallel-
ism," two courts have established different standards of review for
determining whether conscious parallelism in the use of an identical
delivered pricing system violates the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) Act.7
In Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v. FTC,8 the Seventh Circuit
enunciated a per se standard of review, which fueled a national
" 'Conscious parallelism' refers to the interdependent behavior on the part of firms
that, while not explicitly colluding, still take account of one another's actions when making
their business decisions." Averitt, The Meaning of "Unfair Methods of Competition " in Section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act, 21 B.C. L. REV. 227, 257 (1980). Conscious parallelism
generally occurs in highly concentrated or oligopolistic industries. Id. See note 30 and accompa-
nying text infra. For a basic introduction to the economics of conscious parallelism, see F.
SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 152-60 (2d ed. 1980).
Commentators also term conscious parallelism "oligopolistic interdependence" or "tacit collu-
sion." R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 40 (1976).
2 See, e.g., Blechman, Conscious Parallelism, Signalling and Facilitating Devices: The Problem of
Tacit Collusion Under the Antitrust Laws, 24 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 881 (1979); Posner, Oligopoly
and the Antitrust Laws: A SuggestedApproach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562 (1969); Turner, The Definition
of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655
(1962); Note, Conscious Parallelism and the Sherman Act: An Analysis and a Proposal, 30 VAND. L.
REV. 1227 (1977).
' See notes 13-23 and accompanying text infra.
4 See, e.g., Hilder, The Attack Upon Delivered Price Systems, 14 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 397
(1946); Mund, The Development and Incidence of Delivered Pricing in American Industry, 15 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 141 (1950); Sheehy, The Legal and Factual Content of Recent Geographic Pricing
Cases, 37 GEO. L.J. 183 (1949); Note, Price Systems and Competition: The Basing-Point Issues, 58
YALE LJ. 426 (1949).
5 See notes 46-63 and accompanying text infra.
6 See, e.g., Turner, supra note 2, at 663-73. But see R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 39-77.
7 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Section 5 of the FTC Act states that
"[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful." Id. § 45(a)(1).
8 168 F.2d 175 (7th Cir. 1948), aff'd by an equally divided Court sub nom. Clayton Mark &
Co. v. FTC, 336 U.S. 956 (1949).
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controversy concerning delivered pricing systems.9 Thirty years
later, the Ninth Circuit's decision in Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC 0
established a standard of review requiring the FTC to demonstrate an
effect on prices in order to invalidate a consciously parallel delivered
pricing system." In Boise Cascade, the FTC argued for a standard of
review that would require the FTC to show only the artificiality of the
challenged delivered pricing system.' 2 Thus, three potential stand-
ards of review for determining the legality of conscious parallelism in
the use of delivered pricing systems have arisen from these two deci-
sions. An analysis of the three approaches indicates that courts should
adopt a modified per se rule similar to the one enunciated more than
thirty years ago by the Seventh Circuit in Triangle Conduit.
I
DELIVERED PRICING SYSTEMS
In a delivered pricing system the price paid to a producer in-
cludes both the price at the point of production (the mill price) and a
freight charge to the point of delivery. 13 Producers who use a deliv-
ered pricing system, however, do not charge most buyers the actual
freight on their shipments; some buyers pay more, and others pay
less.' 4 The primary alternative to a delivered price is a free on board
(f.o.b.) mill price. Under this arrangement, the producer quotes only
a mill price, and the buyer selects the mode and route of transporta-
tion and pays the actual freight charge to the delivery destination.1 s
9 See notes 74-79 and accompanying text infra.
10 637 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1980).
n See notes 80-87 and accompanying text infra.
12 See notes 87 & 88-92 and accompanying text infra.
1 Landon, Geographic Price Structures, 15 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 125, 131 (1950); Note,
supra note 4, at 427 & n.4. Buyers can pay the delivered price only'at the point of delivery. See
id. at 427.
Many commentators have studied the economics of delivered pricing systems. See, e.g., F.
MACHLUP, THE BASING POINT SYSTEM 91-247 (1949); Clark, Basing Point Methods of Price
Quoting, 4 CAN. J. EcoN. & POL. Sci. 477 (1938); Kaysen, Basing Point Pricing and Public Policy,
63 Q.J. EcoN. 289 (1949); Smithies, Aspects of the Basing Point System, 32 AM. ECON. REv. 705
(1942).
14 Landon, supra note 13, at 131; Note, supra note 4, at 427 & n.4. See notes 17-23 and
accompanying text infra. When a buyer pays more than the actual freight charge, the surplus is
"phantom freight." F. SCHERER, supra note 1, at 328; Note, Basing-Point Pricing and Antitrust
Policy, 55 YALE LJ. 558, 559 (1946). "Freight absorption" occurs when a buyer pays less than
the actual freight charge and the producer absorbs the difference. F. SCHERER, supra note 1, at
328; Note, supra, at 559.
Is Landon, supra note 13, at 129. Normally, producers who adopt f.o.b. mill pricing
systems permit the buyer to pick up the product at the mill. Alternatively, the seller may quote
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A. Types of Delivered Pricing Systems
American industries employ two types of delivered pricing sys-
tems: basing point systems and zone pricing systems. 6 Under a
basing point system, the delivered price consists of a mill price 17 plus a
transportation charge from a basing point to the buyer's destina-
tion.18 Under a single basing point system, the cost of the product to
the customer consists of the mill price plus a freight charge from a
single production point or base.' Under a multiple basing point
system, a producer establishes several production points as bases, and
the price of the product to the customer consists of the mill price plus a
freight charge from the basing point that results in the lowest delivered
price. 20  Under a zone pricing system, sellers quote an identical price
to all buyers within a designated geographical zone, regardless of the
actual transportation costs.2 1  Under a single zone or "postage
stamp" system, producers quote a single, uniform delivered price to
a delivered price that incorporates the actual mode and route selected by the buyer and then
not allow the customer to pick up the product at the mill. This would not be a delivered pricing
system. See note 14 and accompanying text supra.
16 Wright, Collusion and ParallelAction in Delivered Price Systems, 37 GEo. L.J. 201, 202 (1949).
Other categorizations are possible. See, e.g., Kaysen, supra note 13, at 292-93 (single basing
point systems and universal freight equalization systems); Landon, supra note 13, at 126-29
(basing point systems, zone pricing systems and freight equalization systems).
17 Sellers may quote the mill price from any production point.
18 R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 70; Wright, supra note 16, at 202; Note, supra note 14, at
558-59. For examples of basing point systems, see notes 19 & 20 infra. Numerous industries,
including the steel, lead, plywood, and sugar industries, have employed basing point systems.
F. SCHERER, supra note 1, at 327. For a more extensive discussion of industries that have
employed a basing point system, see F. MACHLUP, supra note 13, at 61-90.
10 F. SCHERER, supra note 1, at 327; Note, supra note 14, at 559. For example, if Chicago
were the basing point for the steel industry, a steel company in Pittsburgh, quoting a price to a
buyer in Denver, would add the freight cost from Chicago to Denver to the mill price, rather
than the actual freight from Pittsburgh to Denver. The steel industry employed the most
famous single basing point system-"Pittsburgh plus"-until 1924, when the FTC declared it
an unfair method of competition. See United States Steel Corp., 8 F.T.C. 1 (1924).
20 F. SCHERER, supra note 1, at 328; Note, supra note 14, at 559. For example, if Chicago
and Denver were the only basing points for the steel industry, a steel company in Pittsburgh,
quoting a price to a buyer in New York, would add the freight cost from Chicago to New York,
rather than the freight cost from Denver to New York, because the Chicago-New York freight
cost would be lower. The cement industry employed probably the most famous multiple basing
point system until 1948 when the Supreme Court declared it unlawful. See FTC v. Cement
Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
" Landon, supra note 13, at 139; Wright, supra note 16, at 202. For examples of zone
pricing systems, see notes 22 & 23 infra. Numerous industries, including' the hardware,
aluminum, soap, and paper industries, have employed zone pricing systems. Landon, supra
note 13, at 140.
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all buyers.2 2 Under a multiple zone system, producers quote an
identical delivered price only to buyers within the same zone. 3
B. Industry Characteristics that Foster Delivered Pricing Systems
Industries that develop delivered pricing systems 24 tend to share
several common characteristics.2 5  First, the products are generally
homogeneous.26  Second, transportation costs frequently constitute a
substantial portion of the delivered price.27  Third, efficient operation
usually requires a large scale of production.2 8  Fourth, producers and
buyers commonly are scattered geographically.2 9 Finally, the indus-
try is typically oligopolistic. 30
If an industry has these traits but lacks a delivered pricing sys-
tem, any producer can charge a lower price in a nearby market
because his transportation costs to the nearby market are less than
those incurred by more distant sellers. If the producer wants to ex-
pand his business by acquiring customers in a distant market, he must
' F. SCHERER, supra note 1, at 326; Landon, supra note 13, at 139. For example, a steel
producer in Pittsburgh would quote the same delivered price to a buyer in Chicago and a buyer
in Denver. The delivered price is high enough to cover total freight charges, but close buyers
pay more than the actual freight costs and distant buyers pay less. F. SCHERER, supra note 1, at
326; Landon, supra note 13, at 139.
2 F. SCHERER, supra note 1, at 326; Landon, supra note 13, at 139. For example, assume
the United States were divided into two price zones-east and west of the Mississippi River-
with the delivered price to the west zone higher than the delivered price to the east zone. A steel
producer in Chicago would quote the same delivered price to buyers in New York and
Pittsburgh, but a higher delivered price to a buyer in St. Louis, even though the producer is
closer to St. Louis.
24 See notes 18 & 21 supra.
2 These industry characteristics also foster collusion and price fixing. See R. POSNER, supra
note 1, at 54-71.
2" Kaysen, supra note 13, at 290; Note, supra note 4, at 431; Note, supra note 14, at 560.
Therefore, the output of one producer can substitute for the output of another, and buyers
prefer one seller's product over another's primarily on the basis of price. Id.
27 Kaysen, supra note 13, at 290; Note, supra note 4, at 431; Note, supra note 14, at 560.
The relatively large transportation costs are often attributable to the low price per volume of
the product.
28 Kaysen, supra note 13, at 291; Note, supra note 4, at 431; Note, supra note 14, at 560.
This factor encourages competition because producers normally want to maintain as high a
level of production as possible.
21 Kaysen, supra note 13, at 290-91; Note, supra note 4, at 431; Note, supra note 14, at
560-61. This feature, often termed "spatial differentiation," F. SCHERER, supra note 1, at 325,
is crucial to the creation and eventual anticompetitive effects of delivered pricing systems. See
notes 38 & 44 and accompanying text infra.
30 Kaysen, supra note 13, at 291; Note, supra note 4, at 430; Note, supra note 14, at 561.
Oligopoly, or "producer interdependence," is a prerequisite to the formation of a delivered
pricing system. See notes 31-36 and accompanying text infra. One commentator has suggested
that the presence of large buyers also facilitates the development of a delivered pricing system.
Note, supra note 4, at 431-32.
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charge a lower price in the distant market than is charged by the
distant sellers.3 In order to underprice the distant sellers, the pro-
ducer must accept a lower net mill price because his transportation
costs to the distant market exceed those incurred by the distant sellers.
In an oligopolistic industry, however, if one producer cuts prices, the
other sellers normally follow. 32 This behavior results in "a general
erosion of the price structure .. . and perhaps even outright price
warfare." 33 "In short, price competition . ..becomes financial di-
saster." 34  To prevent this breakdown in oligopoly discipline, deliv-
ered pricing systems typically develop, 35 thereby allowing all pro-
ducers to quote identical delivered prices to any individual buyer. 36
C. Anticompetitive Effects
The industry-wide adoption of a delivered pricing system pro-
duces several anticompetitive effects, the most important of which are
the elimination of price competition 37 and the promotion of price
31 See note 26 supra.
32 F. SCHERER, supra note 1, at 326-27; Note, supra note 4, at 432.
33 F. SCHERER, supra note 1, at 327.
34 Note, supra note 4, at 432.
35 F. SCHERER, supra note 1, at 327.
36 F. SCHERER, supra note 1, at 329; Kaysen, supra note 13, at 291. One of the purposes of a
delivered pricing system is to facilitate collusion by implementing identical prices-the sys-
tem's "outstanding feature," id. -thus reducing the possibility of disagreement over price and
cartel breakdown. R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 70; F. SCHERER, supra note 1, at 171. A delivered
pricing system, however, does not preclude firms from making secret discounts.
High transportation costs and geographic dispersion give producers "freight advantage
territories" in which they have delivered price advantages. Id. at 326, 330. The industry-wide
uniformity of delivered prices, however, allows producers to compete in geographic markets in
which they would otherwise be unable to compete. Id. at 330. In this regard, a delivered
pricing system allows market interpenetration and is procompetitive. Id. Producers achieve
market interpenetration, however, through "passive acceptance of prices ordained by the
system"; thus, the market structure fails to encourage greater price competition as a result of
the increased interfirm contact. Id.
3' Mund, supra note 4, at 155 ("Basing point and zone delivered pricing systems operate
... to eliminate price competition. . . ."); Smithies, supra note 13, at 709 ("[T]he basing
point system is inconsistent with [price] competition."); Note, supra note 4, at 434 ("The
ultimate function of a [delivered pricing system] is to establish price levels that are sta-
ble .. "); Note, supra note 14, at 654 ("One of the most significant effects of a basing-point
system is a suppression of price competition."). "Competition is impaired because basing
point pricing systems reduce what would be an incredibly complicated price quotation prob-
lem, if executed independently, to a relatively simple matter of applying the right formula." F.
SCHERER, supra note 1, at 329. For example, in 1936, eleven cement firms submitted sealed bids
for the delivery of 6,000 barrels of cement; every firm bid $3.286854 per barrel. FTC v.
Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 713 n.15 (1948).
Delivered pricing systems also cause higher price levels than would result from indepen-
dent pricing by each seller. Note, supra note 4, at 435. For a more detailed discussion of this
effect, see F. MACHLUP, supra note 13, at 202-13.
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discrimination. 38  Furthermore, because all producers quote the same
price to any one buyer, a buyer has no incentive to trade with a
nearby rather than a distant seller; thus, society suffers the cost of
excessive cross-hauling.3 9 A delivered pricing system also distorts
industrial location decisions by forcing producers and buyers to
choose between basing point and nonbasing point locations. 40  In
addition, delivered pricing schemes retard the adjustment of capacity
in response to demand shifts in the industry by, for example, allowing
producers to reallocate output from nearby regions where demand has
38 F. SCHERER, supra note 1, at 329 ("[B]asing point pricing . . . is discriminatory.");
Note, supra note 4, at 435 ("All delivered price policies involve geographical price discrimina-
tion by individual sellers."). But cf. id. at 434-36 (suggesting that this effect is justified as a
complaint against delivered pricing systems only in certain circumstances). Price discrimina-
tion occurs when sellers receive different net prices (delivered price less actual freight cost) from
different buyers for the same product. Id. at 435. Only f.o.b. mill pricing avoids price
discrimination. Id. See also note 15 and accompanying text supra.
An essential condition for price discrimination is the ability to separate markets. Unless a
producer can prevent resale, customers buying at a lower delivered price can over-buy and
then sell the surplus to other customers, thereby eliminating the price discrimination. High
transportation costs and geographic dispersion of customers provide natural barriers to resale
and allow the maintenance of a delivered pricing system. Note, supra note 4, at 435 n.29. See
also notes 27 & 29 and accompanying text supra. For a more detailed discussion of this effect,
see F. MACHLUP, supra note 13, at 137-81; Wooden, The Concept of Unlawful Discrimination as It
Applies to Geographic Prices, 37 GEO. L.J. 166 (1949).
39 For example, a New York buyer may purchase from a Chicago firm, while a Chicago
buyer purchases from a New York firm. Note, supra note 4, at 434.
Delivered pricing systems also foster excessive transportation costs because they generally
assume rail freight, thus discouraging more economical and more efficient methods of trans-
portation. F. SCHERER, supra note 1, at 331-32; Note, supra note 4, at 434; Note, supra note 14,
at 559. Producers are reluctant to use cheaper methods of transportation because their cus-
tomers then might demand a rebate, the payment of which would disrupt the pricing system.
F. SCHERER, supra note 1, at 332. For a more extensive discussion of the excessive transporta-
tion costs delivered pricing systems engender, see F. MACHLUP, supra note 13, at 190-202.
40 F. SCHERER, supra note 1, at 332-33; Note, supra note 14, at 567-68. But see Note, supra
note 4, at 437-38 (suggesting delivered pricing systems have little or no effect on sellers'
location decisions). Depending on such factors as "geographic distribution of customers and
basing points, the structure of freight rates, the nonprice advantages (such as more rapid
delivery) of greater proximity to customers, and the costs of producing at alternative loca-
tions," a delivered pricing system may affect a seller's locational decision. F. SCHERER, supra
note 1, at 333. For example, under a single basing point system, a seller may choose to locate at
a nonbase location if the benefits from nearby sales (on which the seller realizes phantom
freight) exceed the losses from distant sales (on which the seller must absorb freight charges).
See id. On the other hand, a delivered pricing system may affect a buyer's locational decision.
For example, commentators claim that the "Pittsburgh plus" system retarded the development
of the steel fabricating industry in the South and West because fabricators (the buyers) chose to
locate near Pittsburgh, the single basing point. F. MACHLUP, supra note 13, at 236-37; Kaysen,
supra note 13, at 300-06. For more extensive discussions of the effect of a delivered pricing
system on locational decisions, see F. MACHLUP, supra note 13, at 233-47; Johnson, The
Restrictive Incidence of Basing Point Pricing on Regional Development, 37 GEO. L.J. 149 (1949).
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decreased to distant regions where demand has remained constant. 41
Finally, a delivered pricing system fosters concentration in an indus-
try by encouraging intra-industry mergers and by impeding the ex-
pansion of existing firms as well as the entrance of new firms.42
A delivered pricing system will produce these anticompetitive
effects, however, only when specific conditions exist. First, every
seller must adopt the same delivered pricing system. 43  Second, the
producers and buyers must be geographically dispersed. 44 Finally,
buyers must not have the option to purchase on an f.o.b. mill pricing
basis. 4
5
II
CONSCIOUS PARALLELISM AND DELIVERED PRICING
SYSTEMS UNDER THE FTC ACT
Challenges to delivered pricing systems have arisen under three
federal antitrust statutes: section 1 of the Sherman Act,46 section 13 of
the Robinson-Patman Act, 47 and section 5 of the FTC Act.48  As a
41 F. SCHERER, supra note 1, at 333. But see Note, supra note 4, at 438 (suggesting delivered
pricing systems do not cause excess capacity). The same excess capacity exists when a producer
reallocates output from nearby regions where demand has remained constant to distant regions
where demand has increased. In both situations, the delivered pricing system allows the
producer to compete with distant sellers notwithstanding his larger transportation costs, thus
permitting the producer to maintain total output. For a more detailed discussion of this
phenomenon, see F. MACHLUP, supra note 13, at 221-33.
42 F. MACHLUP, supra note 13, at 215. See also Edwards, Geographic Price Formulas and the
Concentration of Economic Power, 37 GEo. L.J. 135 (1949).
41 "An individual seller's delivered price policy becomes significant as an anti-competitive
device only when every other seller is using the same formula, and when all sellers are
confident that gladly or reluctantly everyone will stick to it." Note, supra note 4, at 434.
44 In fact, "the whole set of freight pricing practices aris[es] in response to differences in the
geographic distance separating producers from their customers." F. SCHERER, supra note 1, at
325. See note 29 and accompanying text supra; note 38 supra.
4- Otherwise, a buyer could avoid the anticompetitive effects of a delivered pricing system.
46 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976). Section 1 states, in part, that "[e]very contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . . is declared
to be illegal." The government has used § 1 to combat the price effects of delivered pricing
systems. See, e.g., Sugar Inst., Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936); Maple Flooring
Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
47 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1976). This Act declares that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any
person engaged in commerce ... to discriminate in price between different purchasers of
commodities of like grade and quality .... " Id. § 13(a). The government has used this Act to
redress the price discrimination effects of delivered pricing systems. See, e.g., Corn Prods.
Refining Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726 (1945); FTC v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746
(1945).
48 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1976 & Supp. III 1979); see note 7 supra. The FTC has used § 5 to
attack both the effect on prices and the price discrimination effects of delivered pricing systems.
See, e.g., FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948); Fort Howard Paper Co. v. FTC, 156
F.2d 899 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 795 (1946); Salt Producers Ass'n v. FTC, 134 F.2d
354 (7th Cir. 1943).
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result of these challenges, an agreement to use a delivered pricing
system constitutes a per se illegal form of price fixing.49 A single
standard of review for determining whether the consciously parallel
use of a delivered pricing system violates these antitrust statutes,
however, does not exist.
A. The Early Cases
The Supreme Court first analyzed the legality of delivered pric-
ing systems in 1925. In Maple Flooring Manufacturers Association v. United
States50 and Cement Manufacturers Protective Association v. United States,5
the Court held that the basing point systems under attack did not
violate the Sherman Act. 52  In each case, the Court premised its
holding on the government's failure to allege or prove the existence of
an agreement to use a delivered pricing system.53 In Maple Flooring,
49 Herbert, Delivered Pricing As Conspiracy and As Discrimination: The Legal Status, 15 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 181, 184-85 (1950) ("[Cloncerted use of the basing point system . . . [is]
unlawful under Section 1 of the Sherman Act."); Note, supra note 14, at 574 ("[C]oncerted
action in maintaining a basing-point system is a type of price-fixing.") (footnote omitted).
Concerted action in the use of a zone pricing system also eliminates price competition and is
per se illegal. Mund, supra note 4, at 151-52.
Price fixing agreements have long been held per se illegal. United States v. Socony-Vac-
uum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940) ("Any combination which tampers with price
structures is engaged in an unlawful activity."). See also United States v. Trenton Potteries
Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927). A court may infer an agreement from the facts where no direct
evidence of agreement exists. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 142
(1948); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809 (1946); Interstate Circuit,
Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 225 (1939); Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n
v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 612 (1914). See generally L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF ANTITRUST § 109 (1977). Conscious parallelism along with some "plus factors" is enough to
find agreement. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co. v. United States, 197 F.2d 489, 497 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 892 (1952). Sufficient "plus factors" include proposals for joint action,
identical responses, direct communication, failure to deny agreement, and situations in which
a producer would benefit only if all producers participated in an agreement. L. SULLIVAN,
supra, § 110.
Initially, commentators disagreed over wlhether an agreement to use a delivered pricing
system was per se illegal or whether illegality depended on a showing of an unreasonable
restraint of trade. See Herbert, supra, at 183 n.8.
268 U.S. 563 (1925). The delivered pricing system in Maple Flooring actually existed as
part of a much broader information exchange arrangement. Under this arrangement, the
manufacturers' association compiled and distributed statistics on average costs for all mem-
bers, freight books based on freight from Cadillac, Michigan, and sales information. Id. at
566-67. Producers would then quote delivered prices using Cadillac as the basing point. Id. at
570-71.
-' 268 U.S. 588 (1925). The delivered pricing system in Cement Manufacturers also existed as
part of a broader information exchange agreement, id. at 591-93, which facilitated the multiple
basing point system employed by the industry. See id. at 597.
S2 Maple Flooring, 268 U.S. at 586; Cement Manufacturers, 268 U.S. at 606.
53 Maple Flooring, 268 U.S. at 567 ("[I]t is neither alleged nor proved that there was any
agreement among the members of the Association .. "); Cement Manufacturers, 268 U.S. at
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however, the Court did suggest that a Sherman Act violation would
exist if producers used a delivered pricing system as the basis of a price
fixing agreement.5 4
The Court returned to this theme nine years later in Sugar Insti-
tute, Inc. v. United States,55 in which it held that the existence of a basing
point system coupled with an agreement to maintain prices consti-
tuted an illegal restraint of trade under the Sherman Act. 56  After the
Sugar Institute decision, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) replaced
the Department of Justice as the primary enforcer of the antitrust laws
in the field of delivered pricing systems.5 v Despite many successful
challenges of delivered pricing systems, 58 each subsequent FTC chal-
lenge contained an allegation and proof of agreement. 9
605 ("[T]he Government does not rely on any agreement or understanding. "). Section 1
of the Sherman Act requires an agreement to support a finding of guilt. See Theatre Enter-
prises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954) (" '[C]onscious
parallelism' has not yet read conspiracy out of the Sherman Act .... ").
Even though the Court premised its holdings on the lack of an agreement among the
manufacturers, the specific characteristics of the delivered pricing systems in both cases were
not likely to produce anticompetitive effects. In Maple Flooring, the producers were not geo-
graphically dispersed and would quote f.o.b. mill prices to customers. 268 U.S. at 570-71. In
Cement Manufacturers, the basing point system was a "natural" expedient adopted by the
producers "in order to compete." 268 U.S. at 598. Significantly, the Cement Manufacturers
Court found that the evidence did not indicate price rigidity, i.e., prices changed frequently
and price uniformity resulted only from competitors meeting those changes. Id. at 605.
It cannot, we think, be questioned that data as to the average cost of flooring...
when combined with a calculated freight rate . . . plus an arbitrary percentage of
profit, could be made the basis for fixing prices or for an agreement for price
maintenance, which, if found to exist, would . . . constitute a violation of the
Sherman Act.
268 U.S. at 572 (dictum).
5 297 U.S. 553 (1936).
Id. at 601. In Sugar Institute, the sugar refiners had used a basing point system as part of
an intricate price fixing plan. Id. at 578 passim. The refiners had adopted a "Code of Ethics"
that required refiners to sell sugar "only upon open prices and terms publicly announced." Id.
at 579. This "Code of Ethics" included a delivered pricing system and denied buyers the right
to purchase at an f.o.b. mill price. Id. at 590. Although the Court found that the refiners had
not entered an agreement to use the delivered pricing system, it did find that the refiners had
agreed to maintain the delivered pricing system. Id.
' Note, supra note 4, at 445. The FTC had attempted to attack the anticompetitive effects
of delivered pricing systems much earlier. In 1924, for example, it issued a cease and desist
order against the single basing point system used in the steel industry. United States Steel
Corp., 8 F.T.C. 1 (1924). Thereafter, however, the FTC withdrew from the field, apparently
under the impression that Maple Flooring and Cement Manufacturers prevented any effective
action. See Note, supra note 4, at 445.
58 See, e.g., Fort Howard Paper Co. v. FTC, 156 F.2d 899 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S.
795 (1946) (zone pricing system); Milk & Ice Cream Can Inst. v. FTC, 152 F.2d 478 (7th Cir.
1946) (basing point system); United States Maltsters Ass'n v. FTC, 152 F.2d 161 (7th Cir.
1945) (basing point system); Salt Producers Ass'n v. FTC, 134 F.2d 354, 356 (7th Cir. 1943)
(zone pricing system).
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More than ten years after the Sugar Institute decision, however,
the Court intimated that the FTC Act does not necessarily require a
finding of agreement in order to invalidate a delivered pricing system.
In FTC v. Cement Institute,0 members of a cement industry trade
association had maintained a multiple basing point delivered pricing
system that enabled association members to quote identical prices and
terms of sale at any given destination. 6 1 Although the Court found
the evidence of conspiracy to adopt a multiple basing point system
among the cement firms sufficient to invalidate the scheme,62 it stated
that "[w]hile we hold that the Commission's findings of combination
were supported by evidence, that does not mean that existence of a
'combination' is an indispensible ingredient of an 'unfair method of
competition' under the Trade Commission Act." 63
The FTC also successfully pursued violators of the price discrimination prohibition of the
Robinson-Patman Act. See, e.g., Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726 (1945); FTC v.
A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746 (1945). See generally Note, supra note 4, at 446-48.
5' Fort Howard Paper Co. v. FTC, 156 F.2d 899, 901-03 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S.
795 (1946); Milk & Ice Cream Can Inst. v. FTC, 152 F.2d 478, 480-82 (7th Cir. 1946); U.S.
Maltsters Ass'n v. FTC, 152 F.2d 161, 163-64 (7th Cir. 1945); Salt Producers Ass'n v. FTC,
134 F.2d 354, 356 (7th Cir. 1943). The Seventh Circuit, however, decided to infer an
agreement to employ a delivered pricing system. See, e.g., Fort Howard Paper Co. v. FTC, 156
F.2d 899, 907 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 795 (1946) ("[T]he artificiality and arbitrariness
of the zone structure [employed here] is so apparent it cannot withstand the inference of
agreement.") (dictum); Milk & Ice Cream Can Inst. v. FTC, 152 F.2d 478, 482 (7th Cir.
1946) ("[I]t taxes our credulity to believe . . . that petitioners employed this [basing point]
system without any agreement or plan among themselves." (dictum).
-0 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
61 Id. at 709-11.
62 Id. at 720.
63 Id. at 721 n.19 (citation omitted) (dictum). To support its contention that a § 5 violation
does not necessarily require an "agreement," the Court relied on FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing
Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922). In Beech-Nut, the Court held that a producer's unilateral efforts to
reduce competition among retail distributors violated § 5 because they were "as effectual as
agreements express or implied intended to accomplish the same purpose." Id. at 455. Thus,
the Beech-Nut Court impliedly held that an anticompetitive practice might constitute an unfair
method of competition under the FTC Act even though it did not also violate the Sherman Act.
The Cement Institute Court also reasoned that "individual... or concerted conduct, which
falls short of being a Sherman Act violation may as a matter of law constitute an 'unfair method
of competition'" if the conduct might grow into a Sherman Act violation if left unrestrained.
333 U.S. at 708. This rationale, later known as the incipiency standard-see, e.g., FTC v.
Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394 (1953) ("[T]he Federal Trade
Commission Act was designed to supplement and bolster the Sherman Act ... to stop in their
incipiency acts and practices which, when full blown, would violate [the Sherman Act].")
(citation omitted)-appears to differ from the Beech-Nut rationale. Under the Beech-Nut ration-
ale, anticompetitive conduct could violate the FTC Act even if it might never "blossom" into a
Sherman Act violation.
An administrative law judge has summarized the reach of § 5 as follows:
Section 5 has been contrued to reach a variety of market activity. First, action
which violates the letter of the antitrust laws may also be condemned under Section
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B. Triangle Conduit
Sixteen days after the Cement Institute decision, the Seventh Cir-
cuit in Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v. FTC6 4 held that section 5 of the
FTC Act does not require proof of an agreement in order to declare a
delivered pricing system illegal. 5  In its complaint, the FTC alleged
that producers of rigid steel conduit had violated section 5 " 'through
their concurrent use of a formula method of making delivered price
quotations with the knowledge that each did likewise, with the result
that price competition between and among them was unreasonably
restrained.' "66 The FTC did not rest this allegation upon a theory
of combination or conspiracy; 6 7 rather, it argued that the concurrent
use of the basing point pricing system was per se illegal.68
5 ". . . since nominally that section registers violations of the Clayton and Sher-
man Acts." . . . Section 5 also reaches activities which threaten incipient violations
of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, or activities which could ripen into conspiracy,
monopolization or attempted monopolization if full blown ....
Section 5 has also been construed to extend to cases where the "spirit" of the
Sherman Act is violated even though the activity is not illegal at common law, or
condemned by the Sherman Act specifically ...
Finally, the Supreme Court in FTC v. Sperry &Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233,
244-45 n.5 (1972), held that the Commission has authority under Section 5 to
"consider public values beyond simply those enshrined in the letter or encom-
passed in the spirit of the antitrust laws."
In re Ethyl Corp., No. 9128, 129 (Aug. 5, 1981) (Barnes, Administrative LawJudge) (citations
omitted), summarized in ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1027, at A-15 (Aug. 13,
1981).
64 168 F.2d 175 (7th Cir. 1948), aff'd by an equally divided Court sub nom. Clayton Mark & Co.
v. FTC, 336 U.S. 956 (1949).
65 168 F.2d at 181.
66 Id. at 176. This was the second count of the FTC's complaint. The first count alleged an
agreement to use the delivered pricing system. Id. The producers of rigid steel conduit
employed a multiple basing point system, using Chicago and Pittsburgh as the bases. Publica-
tion of freight rates and delivery charges facilitated identity of delivered prices. Id. at 177.
67 In its brief the FTC stated: "Under Count II the issue is simply whether the concurrent
use of the basing point practice-constitutes . . . an unfair method of competition within the
meaning of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act." Brief for FTC, Triangle Conduit
& Cable Co. v. FTC, 168 F.2d 175 (7th Cir. 1948), aff'd by an equally divided Court sub nom.
Clayton Mark & Co. v. FTC, 336 U.S. 956 (1949), quoted in Herbert, supra note 49, at 197.
Triangle Conduit marked the first case in which the FTC alleged that conscious parallelism in the
use of a delivered pricing system violates § 5. Sheehy, supra note 4, at 199 ("There has been no
geographic pricing case in which the Commission has predicated an order solely upon facts
comparable with those alleged in Count II of the Conduit case.").
6" "Count II . . . [is] frankly directed against the basing point practice as being per se an
unfair method of competition, even though not predicated on combination and conspiracy."
Brief for FTC, Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v. FTC, 168 F.2d 175 (7th Cir. 1948), aff'd by an
equally divided Court sub nom. Clayton Mark & Co. v. FTC,. 336 U.S. 956 (1949), quoted in
Herbert, supra note 49, at 197. "The principle of the second count of the Conduit case is
undoubtedly equally applicable to the parallel use of the zone system by a number of sellers."
Herbert, supra note 49, at 201.
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The Seventh Circuit concluded that conscious parallelism in the
use of the basing point system violates section 5 of the FTC Act.6 9
Although some of the court's language signifies that the court adopted
a strict per se standard, 0 close examination of the opinion indicates
that the court invoked the per se rule only because the circumstances
surrounding the industry-wide adoption of the delivered pricing sys-
69 168 F.2d at 181. The court concluded that the issue presented was "identical with the
one the Supreme Court considered in the Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute
case." Id.; see note 63 and accompanying text supra. In finding a § 5 violation, the court stated:
[E]ach conduit seller knows that each of the other sellers is using the basing point
formula; each knows that by using it he will be able to quote identical delivered
prices and thus present a condition of matched prices under which purchasers are
isolated and deprived of choice among sellers so far as price advantage is con-
cerned. Each seller must systematically increase or decrease his mill net price for
customers at numerous destinations in order to match the delivered prices of his
competitors. Each seller consciously intends not to attempt the exclusion of any
competition from his natural freight advantage territory by reducing the price, and
in effect invites the others to share the available business at matched prices in his
natural market in return for a reciprocal invitation.
In light of [Cement Institute], we cannot say that the Commission was wrong in
concluding that the individual use of the basing point method as here used does
constitute an unfair method of competition.
168 F.2d at 181.
The Seventh Circuit also determined that direct evidence of the conspiracy alleged in the
first count existed and that even if direct evidence had not existed, sufficient evidence existed to
infer conspiracy. Id. at 180 ("We think there was direct proof of the conspiracy, but whether
there was or not, in determining if such a finding is supported, it is not necessary that there be
direct proof of an agreement. Such an agreement may be shown by circumstantial evidence.").
Because the court found a conspiracy under the first count, some commentators argue that the
second count must be read in light of the first, that is, that the FTC can bring a charge of
conscious parallelism only if evidence of a conspiracy also exists. A. NEALE & D. GOYDER, THE
ANTITRUsT LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 88-89 (3d ed. 1980); Sheehy, supra note 4,
at 195; Zlinkoff & Barnard, Basing Points and Quantity Discounts: The Supreme Court and a
Competitive Economy, 1947 Term, 48 COLUM. L. REv. 985, 1005 (1948). Others maintain that the
court's language reveals that it never reached the issue of the legality of conscious parallelism in
the use of a delivered pricing system, and that the holding was based on conspiracy or
collusion. See Herbert, supra note 49, at 196. "[T]o construe th[e] second count of the case as
based upon the conspiracy found under the first count," however, "is to make it meaningless
and mere surplusage." Id. at 197.
70 For example, the court apparently rejected the producers' argument that "individual
freight absorption is not illegal per se," 168 F.2d at 180, and thus, implicitly at least, accepted
the per se theory proposed by the FTC, see note 68 and accompanying text supra. Moreover,
the court never required the Commission to establish an actual anticompetitive effect in order
to prove a § 5 violation. Thus, many commentators interpreted the Triangle Conduit case as
declaring all industry-wide delivered pricing systems per se illegal. See, e.g., Herbert, supra note
49, at 196-97. In fact, the congressional furor that arose after the Triangle Conduit case, see notes
74-78 and accompanying text infra, resulted from this perceived interpretation of the case. See
Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at 12-13, Boise Cascade Corp. v.
FTC, 637 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1980).
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tern were likely to produce anticompetitive effects.7 ' In other words,
rather than requiring the FTC to prove an actual anticompetitive
effect under the "rule of reason," 72 the Triangle Conduit court adopted
a modified per se rule requiring the FTC to prove only the existence of
certain industry characteristics likely to produce anticompetitive ef-
fects. 3
71 In finding a § 5 violation, the court stated: "[W]e cannot say that the Commission was
wrong in concluding that the individual use of the basing point method as here used does
constitute an unfair method of competition." 168 F.2d at 181 (emphasis added). This passage
suggests that the court would invoke the per se rule not to invalidate all delivered pricing
systems, but to invalidate only those schemes in which the industry traits indicate a natural
tendency to decrease competition. The findings made by the Commission at the administrative
level support the conclusion that the natural tendency of the pricing scheme adopted by the
conduit producers was to affect prices:
Pursuant to Count II of the complaint herein, the Commission concludes from
the evidence of record, and therefore finds, that the capacity, tendency, and effect of the
use by each respondent named therein of the basing-point, delivered-price formula
to determine price quotations and prices which will be made to conduit purchasers
at any given destination concurrently with similar use of the same pricing formula
by other of the said respondents has been, and is, to hinder, lessen, and restrain competition
in price in the sale and distribution of conduit; to deprive purchasers of the benefits
of competition in price; to unfairly discriminate among purchasers; and to create in
each of said respondents a dangerous tendency toward a monopolistic control over
price in the sale and distribution of conduit.
Rigid Steel Conduit Ass'n, 38 F.T.C. 534, 593 (1944), enforced sub nom. Triangle Conduit &
Cable Co. v. FTC, 168 F.2d 175 (7th Cir. 1948), aff'd by an equally divided Court sub nom.
Clayton Mark & Co. v. FTC, 336 U.S. 956 (1949) (emphasis added). Thus, the per se
standard invoked by the Triangle Conduit court more closely resembles a modified per se rule
akin to the one invoked by the Supreme Court in United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S.
333 (1969). See note 73 and accompanying text infra.
72 The Federal Trade Commission has summarized the rule of reason as follows:
The test of legality is "whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates
and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or
even destroy competition." Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238
(1918); Professional Engineers, . . . 435 U.S. [679], 691 [(1978)]. To assess the legal-
ity of the restrictions under a rule of reason analysis, we must examine their
nature, purpose and effect on competition, including in the calculus any possible
procompetitive impact. Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238
(1918).
American Medical Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. 701, 1003-04 (1979), modified and enforced sub nom. Ameri-
can Medical Ass'n v. FTC, 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 3107 (1981).
13 Although the court did not detail the industry characteristics necessary to invoke the per
se standard, it did note that the sellers were geographically dispersed, 168 F.2d at 177, that the
sellers refrained from using f.o.b. mill pricing, id., and that the sellers uniformly matched
prices, id. As noted above, these industry characteristics must exist before a delivered pricing
system produces anticompetitive effects. See notes 43-45 and accompanying text supra.
Similarly, in United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333 (1969), a majority of the
Court apparently invoked a modified per se standard. The Container Corp. Court was willing to
infer a per se price-fixing violation of the Sherman Act from the industry characteristics:
[A]s we held in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., [310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59
(1940),] interference with the setting of price by free market forces is unlawful per
se. Price information exchanged in some markets may have no effect on a truly
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The Cement Institute and Triangle Conduit decisions provoked a
national controversy over the treatment of delivered pricing systems
under the antitrust laws. Critics charged that the FTC and the courts
were forcing producers to adopt f.o.b. mill pricing.14  A Senate sub-
committee investigated the matter, 75 and congressmen introduced
bills to immunize delivered pricing systems from the antitrust laws.7 6
The FTC initially resisted this pressure,7 7 but eventually succumbed
competitive price. But the corrugated container industry is dominated by relatively
few sellers. The product is fungible and the competition for sales is price. The
demand is inelastic, as buyers place orders only for immediate, short-run needs.
The exchange of price data tends toward price uniformity. For a lower price does
not mean a larger share of the available business but a sharing of the existing
business at a lower return. Stabilizing prices as well as raising them is within the
ban of § 1 of the Sherman Act. As we said in United States v. Socony- Vacuum Oil Co.,
supra, at 223, "in terms of market operations stabilization is but one form of
manipulation." The inferences are irresistible that the exchange of price informa-
tion has had an anticompetitive effect in the industry, chilling the vigor of price
competition.
Id. at 337.
'4 See, e.g., Hilder, supra note 4, at 397-98; Kittelle & Lamb, The Implied Conspiracy Doctrine
and Delivered Pricing, 15 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 227, 227-29 (1950). But see Note, supra note 4,
at 455-56 (applauding the decisions).
'- The Capehart Committee investigated the impact of the Cement Institute decision on
consumers and businesses. Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce on S. Res. 241, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1948). See generally Latham, The Politics of Basing
Point Legislation, 15 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 272, 272-80 (1950).
76 See, e.g., H.R. 2222, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 95 CONG. REC. 778 (1949); S. 236, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess., 95 CONG. REC. 42 (1949); S. 1008, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 95 CONG. REC.
1356 (1949). See generally Latham, supra note 75, at 280-308. House Bill 2222 and Senate Bill
236 would have declared temporary moratoriums on the prosecution of delivered pricing
systems. See 95 CONG. REc. 42, 778 (1949). Senate Bill 1008 would have amended the FTC Act
and the Robinson-Patman Act to permit conscious parallelism in delivered pricing systems;
Congress passed it on June 2, 1950, but President Truman vetoed it on June 16, 1950.
Stocking, The Law on Basing Point Pricing: Confusion or Competition, 2 J. PUB. L. 1, 21 (1953).
Interestingly, Congress had previously attacked, rather than supported, delivered pricing
systems. The Robinson-Patman Act originally included a provision that would have outlawed
basing point pricing. Congress dropped the provision, however, before it passed the Act. 80
CONG. REC. 8223-24 (1936). During the same session, Congress considered, but failed to
enact, two bills aimed solely at outlawing basing point systems. Note, The Cement Decision and
Basing-Point Pricing Systems, 2 VAND. L. REv. 63, 64 (1948). A bipartisan congressional commit-
tee also recommended in 1941 that Congress enact legislation outlawing basing point systems.
See TEMPORARY NATIONAL ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, SEN.
Doc. No. 35, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1941).
" In a notice to its staff, the FTC stated:
In the Rigid Steel Conduit case, the Commission found, and the circuit court
agreed, that adherence to an industry-wide basing point formula, with the knowl-
edge that other concerns are adhering to it also, constitutes in itself a violation of
the Federal Trade Commission Act by the individual adhering companies when
price competition is thereby eliminated. It would have been possible to describe
this state of facts as a price conspiracy on the principle that, when a number of
enterprises follow a parallel course of action in the knowledge and contemplation of
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before the Senate subcommittee.78 Consequently, the FTC did not
challenge conscious parallelism in the use of delivered pricing systems
for the next twenty-five years.70
C. Boise Cascade
In 1974, the FTC issued a complaint against Boise Cascade and
other southern plywood manufacturers, alleging that they had pur-
sued a consciously parallel course of business behavior in the use of a
zone pricing system.80 The FTC subsequently found the delivered
pricing system violative of section 5 on these grounds.8" In reviewing
the FTC's determination, the Ninth Circuit recognized that this was
"the first case since Triangle Conduit in which the Commission ha[d]
grounded its ruling on a finding of conscious parallelism."812 Al-
the fact that all are acting alike, they have, in effect, formed an agreement. Instead
of phrasing its charge in this way, the Commission chose to rely on the obvious fact
that the economic effect of identical prices achieved through conscious parallel
action is the same as that of similar prices achieved through overt collusion, and,
for this reason, the Commission treated the conscious parallelism of action as
violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
F.T.C., Notice to the Staff: In re: Commission Policy Toward Geographic Pricing Practices
(1948), reprinted in G. SAGE, BASING-POINT PRICING SYSTEMS UNDER THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST
LAWS 335-36, app. B (1951). See STUDY OF FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRICING POLICIES:
INTERIM REPORT ON STUDY OF FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRICING POLICIES, SEN. Doc. No.
27, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 41-42 (1949) ("The Commission appears to have formally concluded
that the use of a pricing practice similar to that of the seller's competitor through 'conscious
parallel action' is equally violative of the Federal Trade Commission Act as is conspiracy to use
such a pricing practice.").
78 The Commission "appears to have written off the theory that 'conscious parallel action,'
absent conspiracy, constitutes an unfair method of competition. . . ." STUDY OF FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION PRICING POLICIES: INTERIM REPORT ON STUDY OF FEDERAL TRADE COMMIS-
SION PRICING POLICIES, SEN. Doc. No. 27, 8 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 62 (1949). See Herbert, supra
note 49, at 198-99.
" See R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 71 & n.46. Subsequent prosecutions by the FTC involved
allegations of agreements to use delivered pricing systems. See id. See, e.g., FTC v. Nat'l Lead
Co., 352 U.S. 419 (1957) (zone pricing system); Chain Inst., Inc. v. FTC, 246 F.2d 231 (8th
Cir. 1957) (basing point pricing system). The FTC, in fact, dismissed one action for failure to
demonstrate concerted action. Crouse-Hinds Co., 46 F.T.C. 1114 (1950).
s0 The FTC's complaint alleged that the manufacturers had "for a number of
years ... used and pursued parallel courses of business behavior constituting unfair methods
of competition . . . [including] establishing and maintaining a system of delivered prices
...." Boise Cascade Corp., 91 F.T.C. 1, 5 (1978), enforcement denied, 637 F.2d 573 (9th Cir.
1980). Southern plywood producers would quote a delivered price based on their mill prices
plus freight from the West Coast. Id. at 34. Producers computed this freight factor on the basis
of concentric zones running eastward from Portland, Oregon. Id. at 30. The publication of
freight rate books and industry-wide use of commercial price reporters for setting mill prices
facilitated the delivered pricing system. Id. at 4, 32-34.
8 Id. at 102-03.
8 Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 637 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1980). See note 79 and
accompanying text supra.
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though the court acknowledged that the zone pricing system "ha[d]
the same potential to stabilize prices as basing-point systems," 83 it
declined to follow a per se standard of review as suggested by the
Triangle Conduit court.84 Instead, the court employed another stand-
ard, holding that "in the absence of evidence of overt agreement to
utilize a pricing system to avoid price competition, the Commission
must demonstrate that the challenged pricing system has actually had
the effect of fixing or stabilizing prices." '8 5 Because the FTC had
failed to demonstrate that the delivered pricing system had affected
prices,88 the court refused to enforce the Commission's order. In
addition, the court implicitly rejected the Commission's argument
83 637 F.2d at 575. The plywood industry contained many of the classic characteristics that
enable a delivered pricing system to produce anticompetitive effects: an oligopolistic market
structure, the unavailability of f.o.b. mill pricing, freight factors based on railroad rates, and
payments of phantom freight. Boise Cascade Corp., 91 F.T.C. at 14, 29, 45-46, 51. See notes
14, 30, 39, 45 and accompanying text supra.
" "[I1n view of the approach we have chosen it is not necessary . . . to resolve whether
conscious parallelism might ever support a Section 5 violation." 637 F.2d at 576; see note 86
and accompanying text infra. The court interpreted Triangle Conduit as establishing a strict per
se rule and refused to follow the rule because of the FTC's concessions to the Senate after
Triangle Conduit, see note 78 and accompanying text supra, and because of the FTC's failure to
bring any cases based solely on conscious parallelism in the interim, see note 79 and accompa-
nying text supra. 637 F.2d at 576. The court apparently failed to recognize that Triangle Conduit
established, at most, a modified per se theory. See notes 70-73 and accompanying text supra.
Moreover, the FTC never actually argued for the adoption of a strict per se standard; rather,
the FTC argued that Trinagle Conduit permitted a finding of illegality under § 5 if the conscious
parallelism resulted in an extremely artificial pricing scheme. See Brief for Respondent at 59-69,
Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 637 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1980); note 87 and accompanying text
infra.
The Ninth Circuit also rejected a standard based on § 1 of the Sherman Act. The court
stated that it would not "follow the Commission's suggestion that industry-wide adoption of an
artificial method of price-quoting should be deemed a per se violation of section 5 by analogy to
section 1 [of the Sherman Act] price-tampering cases." 637 F.2d at 581. The FTC, however,
had rejected this approach in its decision, Boise Cascade Corp., 91 F.T.C. at 102 & n.15, and
did not advance it on appeal, Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at 2
n.1, Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 637 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1980). This standard requires that
courts infer an agreement to fix prices, and thus a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act,
from the artificiality of the delivered pricing system. See Boise Cascade Corp., 91 F.T.C. at
101-02. When presented with this standard, the Commission stated that it did not need to
consider the argument because § 5 "permit[ted] a more direct approach." Id. at 102. This
argument represents a fourth possible standard of review, but it is simply the argument the
FTC did advance under § 5 of the FTC Act rather than § 1 of the Sherman Act. See notes 87-89
and accompanying text infra. As such, this standard suffers from the same infirmities as the
FTC's argument. See notes 90-92 and accompanying text infra.
85 637 F.2d at 577.
86 "There is a complete absence of meaningful evidence in the record that price levels in
the southern plywood industry reflect an anticompetitive effect." Id. at 579. The FTC had not
presented any economic testimony and the court rejected the FTC's contention that costs and
profits in the plywood industry indicated an effect on prices. Id. at 580. The court also attached
some significance to the lack of buyers' objections to the delivered pricing system. Id.
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that section 5 of the FTC Act enables the FTC to invalidate a deliv-
ered pricing system because of its "extreme artificiality." 87
III
RESOLVING THE CONFLICT: A MODIFIED PER SE STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Triangle Conduit and Boise Cascade cases reveal three possible
standards of review for determining the legality of conscious parallel-
ism in the use of delivered pricing systems under the FTC Act. Each
of the three standards allows the FTC to challenge consciously parallel
pricing schemes, but each requires a different evidentiary showing by
the FTC. Of the three, the modified per se rule enunciated in Triangle
Conduit best comports with the purposes and goals of the Act.
A. The Degree-of-Artificiality Standard
The standard upon which the FTC had based its decision in Boise
Cascade, and which it urged the Ninth Circuit to adopt, does not
require a showing of agreement. This standard focuses instead on the
87 The court stated that it "was not persuaded that a different result [was] warranted by the
unique features of the FTCA." Id. at 581. The FTC had argued that "the extreme artificiality
of the formula pricing involved in [the] case" justified its determination that the noncollusive
adoption by competitors of a delivered pricing system violated § 5. Boise Cascade Corp., 91
F.T.C. at 102-03. See Brief for Respondent at 59-69, Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 637 F.2d
573 (9th Cir. 1980). In so holding, the Commission had concluded that Triangle Conduit
permitted it to find conscious parallelism in the use of a delivered pricing system violative of §
5. Boise Cascade Corp., 91 F.T.C. at 103. The Commission did not adopt a per se standard of
review, but instead adopted a rule based on the degree of artifiiality of the delivered pricing
system. See notes 88-89 and accompanying text infra.
Under this degree-of-artificiality standard, the FTC maintained that "although it [was]
not possible to demonstrate what the level of prices would have been in the absence of
the . . . [delivered] pricing system," Brief for Respondent at 14, Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC,
637 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1980), "[t]he record support[ed] the conclusion that the practice ha[d]
the tendency to cause plywood to be sold to some customers at prices higher than would have
otherwise existed," id. at 13. To support its contention that the delivered pricing system
resulted in artificially high prices, the FTC introduced voluminous evidence detailing the
intricacies of the pricing scheme, including the industry-wide adoption of west coast freight
prices, the discouragement of f.o.b. mill pricing, and the geographic dispersion of manufac-
turers, which allowed for "phantom freight." See id. at 19-39. From these facts, the FTC
argued for "a prima facie inference that the use of a pricing formula based upon west coast
freight affected the price levels of southern pine plywood." Id. at 15. Thus, in some ways, .the
degree-of-artificiality standard resembles the modified per se standard advanced in this Note.
See notes 103-17 and accompanying text infra. Unlike the modified per se standard, however,
the FTC degree-of-artificiality standard would permit a defendant to rebut the prima facie
showing by demonstrating the absence of anticompetitive effect. See Brief for Respondent at 15,
Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 637 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1980).
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degree of artificiality in the delivered pricing system under review.8 8
Under the degree-of-artificiality standard, if a delivered pricing sys-
tem is so artificial that "its results are likely to depart from competi-
tive norms and . . . its use has little redeeming commercial justifica-
tion," the FTC may declare it an unfair method of competition. 9
The degree-of-artificiality standard, however, offers inadequate
guidance to courts for determining the legality of a delivered pricing
system. It begs the question of how much is too artificial and therefore
illegal, a question the FTC left unanswered. 90 Although the degree-
of-artificiality standard could reach a delivered pricing system that
presents all the requisites for anticompetitiveness, 91 the vague and
imprecise nature of the standard leaves too much to chance in the
antitrust laws. Unlike the modified per se rule, the degree-of-artificial-
ity standard fails to promote certainty and predictability in the anti-
trust laws,92 and is thus an inappropriate test for determining the
legality of conscious parallelism in the use of a delivered pricing
system.
B. The Effect-on-Prices Standard
In Boise Cascade, the Ninth Circuit held that the FTC Act does not
require a showing of agreement in order to prove a violation of section
5.93 The court stated that in the absence of an agreement to use a
delivered pricing system, the government must show that the pricing
plan "has the effect of fixing or stabilizing prices." 94  For several
reasons, this standard is also an inappropriate one for determining the
legality of conscious parallelism in the use of a delivered pricing
system.
88 "[Olur conclusion . . .depends importantly upon the extreme artificiality of the pricing
formula involved in this case." Boise Cascade Corp., 91 F.T.C. at 103 (emphasis added); see
note 87 supra. Notably, the FTC stated that its decision depended upon the artificiality of the
delivered pricing system "in this case." (The Commission also suggested that the degree of
artificiality would "depend[] upon the circumstances" of each case. Id. at 103.) This statement
suggests that the determination of artificiality depends on the facts of each case. Otherwise, the
FTC standard could mean that all delivered pricing systems are extremely artificial, and
therefore all delivered pricing systems are illegal. If this were so, the artificiality standard would
simply be another way of stating a strict per se standard of review.
a Id. at 103. Under the degree-of-artificiality standard, however, a defendant could rebut
the FTC's showing of a tendency toward anticompetitiveness by demonstrating a lack of actual
anticompetitiveness. See note 87 supra.
90 "There is no occasion here . . . for us to decide how much artificiality is too
much.. . ." Boise Cascade Corp., 91 F.T.C. at 103.
91 See notes 43-45 and accompanying text supra.
92 See note 108 and accompanying text infra.
93 637 F.2d at 577. The Sherman Act, however, still requires a finding of agreement. See
note 53 supra.
94 637 F.2d at 577. See text accompanying note 85 supra.
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First, the effect-on-prices standard thrusts an extremely difficult
and costly burden of proof upon the FTC. Typically, it requires a
detailed economic analysis. The Commission first must establish the
price that would have existed without a delivered pricing system; 95
usually, the Commission will introduce the previously existing price
for this purpose. Next, the Commission must establish a causal rela-
tionship between the delivered pricing system and the adverse effect
on prices;. 6 because industry conditions may have changed since the
inception of the delivered pricing system, the government must effec-
tively refute the contention that extraneous factors have caused the
adverse effect on prices. 7  Even though the anticompetitive effects of
industry-wide delivered pricing systems are numerous and well docu-
mented, 98 the practical problems in establishing such anticompetitive
effects in each case are overwhelming. Thus, the effect-on-prices
standard seriously impairs the FTC's ability to enforce the Act.99
Moreover, the effect-on-prices standard demands more of the
government than the FTC Act requires. The legislative history of the
Act indicates that Congress did not intend to require a showing of
present harm to competition. 00 Rather, "[tihe purpose of the Fed-
5 Numerous difficulties exist in establishing such a price. See II P. AREEDA & D. TURNER,
ANTITRUST LAW 344, at 230 (1978) (discussing some of the difficulties in computing a
comparison price for purposes of determining damages); Kruse, Deconcentration and Section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 200, 208 n.49 (1978) (discussing some
of the difficulties in proving anticompetitive effects in the context of the FTC's case against
major cereal manufacturers).
1 Cf. II P. AREEDA & D. Turner, supra note 95, 344, at 229 (In order to determine
damages "[a]fter an illegal price-fixing conspiracy, one would compare the agreed price, or-the
actual price resulting from an agreed formula or other misbehavior, with the price that would
have prevailed in the absence of the illegal conduct." (footnote omitted)).
97 Such factors include changes in supply and demand, price levels, productivity, and
substitutes. See id. at 230.
08 See notes 37-42 and accompanying text supra.
"' But see In re Ethyl Corp., No. 9128 (Aug. 5, 1981) (Barnes, Administrative LawJudge),
summarized in ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1027, at A-15 (Aug. 13, 1981), in
which the administrative law judge had little difficulty in finding an effect on prices: "Thus,
with knowledge that each knew the other was using delivered pricing, the communicative value
and effect of the practice is manifest; the practice enabled respondents to match prices and
avoid the rigors of competition." In re Ethyl Corp., No. 9128, at 152.
100 The following Senate debate on the FTC Act supports this conclusion:
MR. McCUMBER. [A complainant] would have to prove that the competi-
tion was unfair. Then he would have to prove some kind of a result from that unfair
competition. What result would he have to establish under the provisions of [this]
bill?
MR . NEWLANDS. I presume the Senator would not contend that the result
must be proven if we prove that this practice was indulged in with the intent to
injure or destroy.
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eral Trade Commission Act is to prevent potential injury by stopping
unfair methods of competition in their incipiency. "' 0' Thus, the
standard under section 5 should require the government to show, at
most, that the likelihood of an anticompetitive effect resulting from
the challenged conduct is somewhere between a "reasonable possibil-
ity" and a "probability."' 102  The effect-on-prices standard would
frustrate this congressional purpose.
C. The Modified Per Se Standard
The modified per se standard enunciated by the Seventh Circuit
in Triangle Conduit10 3 is preferable to either the degree-of-artificiality or
the effect-on-prices standard, and should be adopted as the test for
determining the legality of conscious parallelism in the use of a deliv-
ered pricing system. Courts should employ a per se rule only when
convinced that a course of conduct is presumptively anticompetitive
and when the economic analysis otherwise required to prove the un-
reasonable restraint of trade is certain to be complex, if not fruit-
less. 0 4 Nevertheless, the numerous and well documented anticom-
MR. McCUMBER. The offense certainly must result in something, else you
could not say that it was unfair competition. In the end, it is competition and the
character of competition that is to be proven, is it not?
MR. NEWLANDS. Then the Senator's idea is that the complainant should
have no remedy at all until the destruction is complete?
MR. McCUMBER. No....
MR. NEWLANDS. [A]Ul you would have to prove would be an unfair
method of competition whose tendency was to stifle competition. I do not think you
would have to wait until the destruction was complete in order to entitle you to
make the complaint. I presume the commission would inquire into the general
tendency of the practice....
51 CoNG. REC. 12217 (1914). One commentator has noted that the FTC has never brought a §
5 case without alleging harm to competition. Howrey, Utilization By The FTC of Section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act as an Antitrust Law, 5 ANTITRUST BULL. 161, 178 (1960). Neverthe-
less, this does not mean the FTC is required to do so. Averitt, supra note 1, at 248.
101 E.B. Muller & Co. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 511, 517 (6th Cir. 1944) (citation omitted). See also
note 63 supra.
102 See Averitt, supra note 1, at 249. In this respect, both the degree-of-artificiality standard
and the modified per se standard comply with the congressional purpose underlying the FTC
Act, because both are premised on the theory that certain conduct has a "tendency" to
produce anticompetitive effects. See note 87 and accompanying text supra; notes 104-05 and
accompanying text infra.
103 See notes 70-73 and accompanying text supra.
104 The guidelines for adopting a per se standard of review were stated in United States v.
Northern Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958):
[T]here are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect
on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be
unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm
they have caused or the business excuse for their use. This principle of per se
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petitive effects of industry-wide delivered pricing systems, 10 5 as well as
the FTC Act's requirement that challenged conduct only have a
tendency to produce anticompetitive effects,' 0 6 justify a modified per
se standard when conscious parallelism creates the delivered pricing
system. Under the modified per se standard, a court should invalidate
a delivered pricing system only when the FTC has established the
existence of certain industry characteristics that experience and eco-
nomic theory have proven likely to produce anticompetitive effects. 10 7
The uniform adoption of a modified per se standard would add
more certainty and predictability-goals of the antitrust laws 1 0 8-to
the law of delivered pricing systems than would either the degree-of-
artificiality or effect-on-prices standard. Furthermore, a per se ap-
proach is appropriate to determine the legality of conscious parallelism
in the use of a delivered pricing system because of the likelihood that
the producers have already entered into an agreement. General con-
sensus is that industry-wide adoption of a delivered pricing system
requires an agreement to make it work for any length of time. 0 9
unreasonableness not only makes the type of restraints which are
proscribed . . more certain to the benefit of everyone concerned, but it also
avoids the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investi-
gation into the entire history of the industry involved, as well as related industries,
in an effort to determine at large whether a particular restraint has been unreasona-
ble-an inquiry so often wholly fruitless when undertaken.
See also United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609-10 n.10 (1972) (suggesting that
the per se rule exists so that courts will not have to "ramble through the wilds of economic
theory").
105 See notes 37-42 and accompanying text supra.
106 See notes 101-02 and accompanying text supra.
107 See notes 112-17 and accompanying text infra.
108 See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609-10 n.10 (1972) ("Without
the per se rules, businessmen would be left with little to aid them in predicting in any particular
case what courts will find to be legal and illegal under the Sherman Act.").
10 Edwards, supra note 42, at 135-36 ("Implicit in the industry-wide use of a basing point
pricing system is an understanding. ... ); Herbert, supra note 49, at 216 ("[Slome sort of
conspiracy or concerted action is essential to the effective functioning of a basing point system
of pricing.") (footnote omitted); Sheehy, supra note 4, at 200 ("[T]here appears to be a strong
probability that geographic pricing systems will not function successfully in the absence of
unlawful conspiracies."); Wright, supra note 16, at 214 ("[B]asing point systems . . . seem
necessarily to require collusion. ... ); Note, supra note 4, at 441 ("As a practical matter, the
maintenance of a rigid delivered pricing system over any length of time requires some form of
agreement among the producers.").
Two schools of thought exist as to the significance of conscious parallelism in delivered
pricing systems. The "conspiracy school" believes that conscious parallelism is itself evidence
of conspiracy. The "spontaneous evolution school" believes that identical delivered pricing
systems can arise from businessmen acting independently to avoid ruinous competition. See
generally Stocking, The Economics of Basing Point Pricing, 15 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 159 (1950)
(analyzing the two theories and concluding that the conspiracy theory is better).
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Proving the existence of such an agreement, however, is difficult. n °
Because an actual agreement is so likely, conscious parallelism in the
use of a delivered pricing system should suffice to establish a per se
violation of the FTC Act.'
IV
APPLYING THE MODIFIED PER SE STANDARD OF REVIEW
Some commentators have criticized a per se standard of review
because it would outlaw all delivered pricing systems.11 2 The modi-
fied per se rule suggested here, however, would invalidate a delivered
pricing system only when an industry has the characteristics necessary
to produce anticompetitive effects: the industry-wide adoption of the
identical pricing scheme, the geographic dispersion of buyers and
sellers, and the unavailability of f.o.b. mill prices." 3  Thus, the
modified per se rule would allow certain delivered pricing
schemes.11 4  Furthermore, a modified per se rule would permit pro-
110 "To prove conspiracy may be difficult. Businessmen who conspire to restrain trade do
not ordinarily leave a trail pointing directly and specifically to their conspiracy. The agreement
may be an informal understanding arrived at through a general discussion of the industry's
problems and ways of solving them." Stocking, supra note 76, at 3.
" For two commentaries arguing that conscious parallelism in the use of delivered pricing
systems should not support a finding of conspiracy, see Kittelle & Lamb, supra note 74, at 236,
and Wright, supra note 16, at 215. Even Professor Turner, however, who generally believes
that conscious parallelism does not constitute an unlawful conspiracy, believes that conscious
parallelism in the use of delivered pricing systems should be illegal. Turner, supra note 2, at
675.
The likelihood of actual agreement suggests that the Department of Justice might attack
conscious parallelism in the use of a delivered pricing system under the Sherman Act. A court
might consider the fact that competitors have adopted the same delivered pricing system as the
"plus factor" from which to infer an agreement. See note 49 supra. Two factors, however,
suggest that the FTC Act and the FTC are better suited to combat conscious parallelism in the
use of a delivered pricing system. First, the FTC's administrative nature and wider economic
expertise suggests that it can better analyze the facts and economic evidence concerning a
delivered pricing system. Second, the FTC Act contains no criminal penalties, and a finding of
a violation of § 5 does not constitute prima facie evidence in a private treble damages suit under
the Act. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 57b(a), 57b(b) (1976); II P. ARaEDA & D. Turner, supra note 95,
324b, at 116.
112 See, e.g., Hilder, supra note 4, at 397-98; Kittelle & Lamb, supra note 74, at 227-28.
113 See notes 43-45 and accompanying text supra. Part of the proposed relief in the Boise
Cascade case would have required producers to quote f.o.b. mill prices as an alternative to
delivered prices. See Boise Cascade Corp., 91 F.T.C. at 110.
114 For example, a locational monopolist who attempts to compete with distant firms for
distant buyers could use a delivered pricing system without running afoul of the modified per se
rule. Although the locational monopolist can demand a monopolistic price in the nearby
market, he can comp te for customers close to his distant competitors only by matching their
price. If the monopolist cannot offer the distant customers a delivered price, but must offer
f.o.b. mill prices, distant customers can purchase goods at the mills and then resell them to the
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ducers to indiscriminately absorb freight charges in order to compete in
a market. Indeed, "unsystematic discriminatory freight absorption
appears to be the best compromise . . . when market structures are
oligopolistic."' ' u The FTC Act allows unsystematic discrimina-
tion,1 16 and commentators generally agree that it is the best pricing
system. i 7
CONCLUSION
Delivered pricing systems represent an area in which the anti-
trust laws should reach consciously parallel behavior. Conscious par-
allelism in the use of delivered pricing systems reduces competition as
much as a price fixing agreement and causes distortions and ineffi-
ciencies in the economy. A standard of review based on the degree of
artificiality of the delivered pricing system is too vague and uncertain.
A standard that requires a showing of an effect on prices does not
comport with the legislatively and judicially declared purposes of the
FTC Act and creates a difficult burden of proof. A modified per se
monopolist's nearby customers. Thus, the monopolist can maintain his locational rents only by
adopting a delivered pricing system. Because the monopolist would be the only seller using
such a system, no anticompetitive effects should occur, and the modified per se rule need not
apply.
In addition, the modified per se rule should not apply when local competitors cannot
supply the local demand. Whether the distant producers are vigorously competing or not, the
distant producers effectively set prices in such a situation. The FTC Act should permit the local
producers to adopt the industry's delivered pricing system in the local market. An example of
this situation occurred initially in the Boise Cascade case. When southern plywood production
began, the southern producers could not meet local demand, even operating at full capacity.
Consequently, prices were effectively set by the west coast plywood producers. In response, the
southern producers adopted the delivered pricing system of the west coast producers in order to
meet those prices. See Boise Cascade Corp., 91 F.T.C. at 55. If local producers cannot meet
local demand, they do not actually use a delivered pricing system because they are selling at
only one location. If they have enough output to sell at some distance from their plant,
however, the modified per se standard would prevent them from employing a delivered pricing
system in any market.
115 F. SCHERER, supra note 1, at 330. Delivered pricing systems typically occur in oligopolis-
tic industries. See note 30 and accompanying text supra. Unsystematic discrimination allows
market interpenetration and increases the probability of a breakdown of the oligopoly struc-
ture. F. SCHERER, supra note 1, at 330. See also note 36 supra.
I1 "Under the Federal Trade Commission Act, where there is neither conscious parallel
action which eliminates price competition nor monopolistic position maintained through unfair
methods, a single enterprise is free to adopt any geographic pricing practice." F.T.C., Notice
to the Staff: In re: Commission Policy Toward Geographic Pricing Practices (1948), reprinted in
G. SAGE, BASING-POINT PRICING SYSTEMS UNDER THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 338, app. B
(1951).
117 See, e.g., F. SCHERER, supra note 1, at 330; Kaysen, supra note 13, at 313; Stocking, supra
note 76, at 27-28. But see F. MACHLUP, supra note 13, at 249-51 (favoring uniform f.o.b.mill
pricing).
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standard of review, however, would be consistent with the reasons for
applying a per se rule, would add certainty and predictability to the
law of delivered pricing systems, and would still allow market inter-
penetration. For these reasons, courts should adopt the modified per
se rule when determining the legality of conscious parallelism in the
use of delivered pricing systems under section 5 of the FTC Act.
Alan M. Anderson
